At a time when scrutiny of Russia’s
overseas influence is growing worldwide — from the investigations
into Russian meddling in the 2016 US election to Moscow’s military
intervention in Syria — Dimitar Bechev's exploration of Russia’s
relationship with its near neighbours in Southeast Europe is highly
relevant.
In “Rival Power: Russia in Southeast
Europe”, Bechev examines Russian relations with the countries of
the Balkan peninsular and Turkey since the fall of communism, looking
at Moscow’s strategic goals in the region and how it has used the
resources at its disposal to achieve them, and conversely the motives
behind the states in the region in their dealings with the East
European major power.
One of the key messages from “Rival
Power” is the pragmatism and lack of idealism on both sides, which
goes against alternative theories of engagement based on historic
solidarity and pan-Slavism. This also contrasts with the
ideologically-driven Russian foreign policy in both Tsarist and
Communist times.
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Instead, “what transpires … is
often crude opportunism”, writes Bechev, a research fellow at the
Center for Slavic, Eurasian and East European Studies at the
University of North Carolina and non-resident senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council. He adds that “as long as there is a scope for the
deal, the price is right, and the opposite party can deliver on
commitments, Moscow is open for business”.
Similarly, the engagement of
governments in regions such as the Western Balkans with Russia is
motivated to a large extent by political gain and economic profit,
and their leaders are “far from passive objects of Russian
policies, much less Moscow’s pliant instruments”.
Bechev devotes sections of the book to
the various countries in the region: the Western Balkans, EU and Nato
members Romania and Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus as “the core of the
pro-Russia camp in the EU”, and — perhaps most interestingly —
Turkey.
Winning over Ankara, says Bechev, is
one of Russia’s most significant achievements in Southeast Europe,
as he charts the “highly complex and ambivalent relationship”
between the region’s two major economies that has combined rivalry
within the post-communist space (a race early on and decisively won
by Russia) and the Middle East, with “growing levels of economic
interdependence, a partial overlap of strategic interests, and a
shared love-hate relationship with Europe and the West”.
Under the two strongman presidents,
Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this relationship
blossomed and while it was tested by their opposing views on Syria
and Turkey’s downing of a Russian bomber, the recent rapprochement
has proved the bond’s resilience.
One of the critical points made in
“Rival Power” is that Russia has been in a relatively weak
position in Southeast Europe vis a vis the Western powers, especially
the EU. Governments across the region, even close allies such as
Bulgaria and Serbia, have made no secret of the fact that they value
their membership in or future accession to the EU above their
relations with Russia.
Still, Russia has managed to claw its
way back from its weak position after the end of the Cold War, and
the scars left by the Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s, to make firm
friends across Southeast Europe even in countries that are firmly in
the Western camp.
To achieve this, the country that
historically had an “unflinching belief in hard power” used a
combination of tools ranging from the military buildup in the Black
Sea, to less conventional levers such as using its position as the
major gas supplier to the region and the use of soft power
instruments to sway local populations in its favour. “The essence
of [Moscow’s] policy is playing a weak hand the best possible way,”
Bechev says.
“Russia is not in a position to
challenge and roll back the EU, draw red lines for the United States,
or control the foreign policy of other states, but it can manipulate
and rally public opinion in its favour,” he writes. While this
doesn't mean Moscow can achieve goals such as keeping countries from
the region out of Euro-Atlantic organisations — witness the failed
campaign to prevent Montenegro from joining Nato — Russia’s
actions are “just enough to muddy the waters and put Europe and, to
a lesser degree, the United States, under constant pressure”.
Looking at Russia’s position in the
region over the last two and a half decades, Bechev argues that its
influence reached its zenith with the planned South Stream project, a
time when “the whole of Southeast Europe appeared to be Russia’s
stomping ground”.
Not only would this have cemented its
position as the gas supplier for the region, it would also have
embedded Russia more deeply with local elites. “What works in
Russia’s favour is not the development of strategic infrastructure
but rather the pervasive state capture in the energy sector across
Southeast Europe,” he writes.
After South Stream was scrapped,
Russian influence started to wane, a situation that is likely to
continue as more countries in the region edge towards membership of
the EU. Yet Moscow’s influence in the region remains “real and
easily observed”.
In the last two years, the West has
also been weakened, creating new opportunities for Russia to assert
itself, especially in the Western Balkans, thanks to both the
fragility of democratic regimes in a region that has seen a slide
towards authoritarianism in some quarters, and the “weakening pull
of the West in the age of Brexit and Trump”.
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Original review on: http://www.intellinews.com
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